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Feminist scholarship developed a focus on articulating women’s ways of  knowing 
and validating women’s different experiences. Reading key scholars Liz Stanley 
and Sue Wise’s (1990) substantial work on feminist praxis, I took seriously the 
argument that epistemology should be understood broadly as addressing the 
questions ‘who can be a “knower”, what can be known, what constitutes and 
validates “knowledge”, and what the relationship is or should be between know-
ing and being’ (Stanley & Wise, 1990, p. 26). The focus of my feminist interest 
in epistemology thus began with my attempt to understand my role as knower, 
and to contribute to the development of multiple and alternative “knowledges”. 
Occupying the margins as a dancer in academia, and also the margins of femi-
nist research in sport, leisure and physical activity, I have nevertheless found a 
role in articulating embodied ways of knowing.
My intention in this chapter is to review key critiques of Western epistemol-
ogy and dualistic ontology, and to discuss feminist epistemologies. These (now 
historical) key critiques informed the development of more recent scholarship 
and contributed to new feminist and phenomenological understandings of 
embodiment and embodied ways of knowing.1 Ultimately, my intention is to 
advocate for and provide an example of feminist theorizing through embodi-
ment as a dancer that may offer insights to other embodied practitioners in 
sport, leisure and physical activity.
K. Barbour (*) 
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 Western Epistemology
The term epistemology has been broadly used to refer to the theory of knowl-
edge, the nature of knowing and understanding (Code, 1991; Jagger & Bordo, 
1989; Stanley & Wise, 1990). In traditional Western philosophy, epistemol-
ogy has been a transcendent, neutral pursuit, establishing the truth of knowl-
edge claims about the objective world (Code, 1991; Jagger & Bordo, 1989). 
Much of the basis of Western epistemology originated in the Enlightenment 
period, developed into the Cartesian tradition and took the task of epistemol-
ogy to be ‘to identify a method by which individual investigators may best use 
their faculties to gain knowledge of the objective structure of reality’ (Jagger 
& Bordo, 1989, p. 3).
Within Western contexts, “knowledge” was defined as this information gained 
through reason, which was the method of knowing (Code, 1991). Western rea-
son required that a statement or knowledge claim be evaluated against objective 
standards and criteria to determine its truth. Statements that could be proved 
true could be accepted as fact, and as objective, universal knowledge. “Knowing” 
utilized both inductive and deductive reasoning as the reliable and valid methods 
to draw conclusions about truth claims. “Knowers” were neutral, rational and 
independent subjects—discoverers of truth in a world accessible through reason 
(Code, 1991; Flax, 1993). The pursuit of objective knowledge required a neutral 
subject, and therefore the differences between individual knowers were to be 
overcome (Jagger & Bordo, 1989).
Alongside these epistemological assumptions, and aim for objective and uni-
versal truth, sat a dualistic ontology that constituted the basis of Western knowl-
edge (Stanley & Wise, 1990; Warren, 1996). This dualistic ontology can be 
traced back to the work of ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle,2 and 
is evident in the work of philosophers Descartes and Kant3 (Stanley, 1990). 
These underlying dualisms included knowledge/experience, mind/body, object/
subject, culture/nature, reason/emotion, thought/sensation, public/private, and 
universal/particular4 (Beauvoir, 1972; Grosz, 1994; Weiss, 1999). This dualistic 
ontology was accepted within Western knowledge and not considered problem-
atic until feminist critique in the twentieth century (Beauvoir, 1972, 2010; 
Jagger & Bordo, 1989). Feminists argued that ‘these dualisms are overlaid by 
gender; only the first of each pair is associated with the male’ (Hartsok, 1983, 
p. 297). Consequently, Western knowledge was revealed as based on a dualistic 
ontology that privileged men and associated qualities, and utilized a logic of 
domination which resulted in the assumption that men were superior to women, 




 Feminist Challenges to Western Knowledge
Feminism is the name for the multitude of perspectives of women who have 
been concerned to critique what counts as knowledge, what knowledge counts, 
and who can know (Du Plessis & Alice, 1998; Reinharz, 1992). Central to 
many feminist perspectives has been an argument that the epistemological 
project to articulate neutral, objective and transcendent knowledge has privi-
leged the understandings of dominant Western white men (Belenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & Tarule 1986; Gatens, 1995; Grosz, 1994). Thus, the claim that 
Western “knowledge” is not gender neutral is central to feminisms (Beauvoir 
1972, 2010; Jagger & Bordo, 1989). However, a simple resolution to the dom-
inance of dualistic ontology, the overwhelming bias of knowledge, and the 
exclusion of body and experience, has not been easily realizable.
Feminists saw that what was required was not simply the addition of women’s 
understandings into “knowledge”, but also a reconstruction and acceptance of 
multiple “knowledges” (Davion, 1994). Articulation of women’s lived experi-
ences was especially important as women sought to reconstruct knowledge, 
power and authority in relation to their different experiences. The feminist slo-
gan “the personal is the political” indicated recognition that the individual expe-
riences of women could be understood as socio-culturally and politically 
contextual (Mills, 1997). Sara Mills commented that ‘those problems which 
many women once considered to be their fault … have come to be seen … as 
problems which are structural and therefore political’ (1997, p. 79). The par-
ticular experiences of an individual woman thus determine her priorities for 
feminist action and her interests in specific feminist theories.
 Feminist Epistemology
While there has been debate between feminists about whether there can be femi-
nist epistemology (Code, 1991; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Jagger & Bordo, 
1989), it certainly seemed important that epistemology be more broadly under-
stood than merely as rational thinking and cognition. For me, epistemology is 
about thinking differently about how I know, and about understanding knowl-
edge in my specific context, evaluating it on its own terms and in relation to 
myself as a knower (Goldberger, Tarule, Clinchy, & Belenky, 1996; Stanley & 
Wise, 1990).
Feminist critiques revealed masculine bias and the constructed nature 
of knowledge. Because the beliefs, practices and experiences of individual 
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women and people other than white Western men had been left out of 
dominant “knowledge”, some feminists described “knowledge” as alienated 
from its context (Stanley, 1990). Such ‘epistemologies that cannot account 
for women’s experiences, and/or that denigrate their experiential knowl-
edge have to be displaced’ (Code, 1991, p. 251)— reconceived entirely by 
revealing and reshaping underlying assumptions (Keller & Grontkowski, 
1983). Feminists have thus argued that gender and individual identity are 
significant in the process of becoming a subject and a knower (Flax, 1993). 
Being a subject or knower entails multiplicity and diversity, and recogni-
tion of the ways in which socio-cultural, political, historical and embodied 
differences structure the knower (Hawkesworth, 1989). While the indi-
vidual woman is contextualized, ‘she none the less exists as a thinking, 
feeling subject and social agent, capable of resistance and innovations pro-
duced out of the clash between contradictory subject positions and prac-
tices’ (Weedon, 1987, p.  125). Subjectivity thus can be redefined as 
constructed and socially produced rather than totally biologically deter-
mined. Conceived this way, subjectivity is incomplete, heterogeneous 
(Flax, 1993) and constantly shifting. The “subject” is thus an unstable, 
fragmented and fluid notion, rather than a single and unified identity con-
stant over time.
Rather than only occurring through reasoning of a neutral subject, knowing 
can occur through experiencing. In this sense, knowing is a practice rather than 
simply a method of deductive and inductive reasoning. Feminists understood 
knowledges as conventional rather than transcendent, and as based on the 
‘judgements of a community of fallible inquirers’ (Harding & Hintikka, 1983; 
Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 549). As Code defined it ‘knowledge is an intersubjec-
tive product constructed within communal practices of acknowledgment, cor-
rection and critique’ (1991, p.  224). Recognition of different knowledges, 
alternative ways of knowing and the relevance of the particular knower, is cru-
cial from a feminist perspective. In recognizing difference, knowledge may be 
grounded in lived experiences and built out of the experiences of many differ-
ent people.
Thus, the feminist challenge to Western epistemology has been to reveal 
the constructed nature and male bias of “knowledge”, to recreate “knowl-
edges” to include multiple perspectives, and to validate women as knowers. 
Feminist researchers, including Mary Belenky, Blythe Clinchy, Nancy 
Goldberger and Jill Tarule (1986), undertook research specifically on wom-
en’s ways of knowing.
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 Women’s Ways of Knowing
Beginning from the premise that much of the work on ways of knowing has 
focused on the experiences of white Western men, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, 
and Tarule (1986) undertook extensive interviewing with many different 
American women to listen to their experiences and to understand their episte-
mological assumptions. The authors were able to articulate five epistemological 
positions or strategies that characterized the women in their study (Goldberger 
et al., 1996). They were careful to point out that the positions they outlined 
were not universal, fixed or exhaustive, and not necessarily exclusive to women 
(Belenky et al., 1986). They also acknowledged that these positions ‘cannot 
adequately capture the complexities and uniqueness of an individual woman’s 
thought and life’ (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 15). They offered five epistemologi-
cal strategies, summarized as follows:
 1. Silence—woman experiences herself as mindless and voiceless, dependent 
on external authority.
 2. Received knowledge—woman conceives of herself as capable of receiving 
and possibly reproducing knowledge from authority, but not of creating 
her own.
 3. Subjective knowledge—woman conceives of truth and knowledge as per-
sonal, private and subjectively known or intuitive.
 4. Procedural knowledge—woman is learning and applying outside proce-
dures for accessing and communicating knowledge.
 5. Constructed knowledge—woman views all knowledge as contextual and 
experiences herself as creator of knowledge, valuing both her own and 
objective strategies for knowing. (Belenky et al., 1986)
Belenky et al. (1986, p. 133) commented that the ‘quest for self and voice’ was 
a central motivation in the transformation women experienced in developing 
their ways of knowing. As a result, many feminists (Goldberger, 1996) have 
understood the epistemological positions as a developmental scheme,5 although 
later research framed them more clearly as epistemological strategies from which 
women might select.
The articulation of constructed knowing (the fifth epistemological posi-
tion) resonated for me with feminist creative and emancipatory agendas, in 
the sense that women who attempted to integrate their own and other voices 
‘had learned the profound lesson that even the most ordinary human being is 
engaged in the construction of knowledge’ (Belenky et  al., 1986, p.  133). 
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The authors suggested that women came to constructed knowledge ‘as an effort 
to reclaim the self by attempting to integrate knowledge they felt intuitively 
was important with knowledge they had learned from others’ (Belenky et al., 
1986, p. 143). Such women were characterized by self-reflectiveness and self- 
awareness, a high tolerance of ambiguity, awareness of the inevitability of con-
flict, attempts to deal with the rich complexity of life as a whole and the desire 
to share their knowledge in their own way. Belenky et al. suggested that
Once knowers assume the general relativity of knowledge, that their frame of 
reference matters and that they can construct and reconstruct frames of refer-
ence, they feel responsible for examining, questioning, and developing the sys-
tems that they will use for constructing knowledge. (1986, pp. 138–139)
Such knowers asked questions about the nature of knowledge, assessing ‘the 
appropriateness and utility of a particular way of knowing given the moment, 
situation, cultural and political imperatives, and relational and ethical ramifi-
cations’ (Goldberger, 1996, p. 356). They became ‘passionate’ knowers, ‘weav-
ing their passions and intellectual life’ together (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 141; 
Goldberger, 1996).
There were valuable critiques by feminists of these women’s ways of know-
ing, such as the need to avoid essentializing women’s knowing, the potential 
misrepresentation of the multiplicity of women’s knowing by white educated 
feminists, the potential slide into subjective relativism, and the value of wom-
en’s ways of knowing as a developmental scheme (Code, 1991; Goldberger 
et al., 1996). However, as Goldberger commented, ‘When context is factored 
into the study of knowing, one begins to see the advantages of thinking of five 
categories as strategies for knowing (rather than person types)’ (1996, p. 362). 
Individuals might then choose and use different strategies depending on their 
personal contextual requirements.
Belenky et al. (1986) have also been criticized for assuming that the women 
they studied were fixed, unitary subjects who were capable of giving authentic 
reports about their knowing (Code, 1991). However, by commenting on the 
knower’s many alternative strategies for knowing, Belenky et al. (1986) reveal 
that she is open to shifts and radical changes in how she knows and what she 
knows. She has no “authentic” voice, or alternatively, her voice is “authentic” 
in as much as any voice ever could be. The subject cannot be a fixed and 
 unitary one, as Belenky et al. (1986) described the women in their study, if 
they are also open to constant epistemological shifts and changes.
Continuing this research, Nancy Goldberger (1996) and Elizabeth Debold, 
Deborah Tolman, and Lyn Brown (1996), began investigation into bodily 
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ways of knowing and knowledge. They were interested in knowledge that was 
grounded in bodily experiences, sensations and cues. Such knowledge was 
seen as rich, complex and non-propositional, and potentially avoided rein-
scribing the knowledge/experience and mind/body dualisms (Goldberger, 
1996). Bodily knowing has been explored by others seeking to share women’s 
sensory lived experiences in movement, as I will discuss below. However, 
before I offer any discussion of bodily and embodied knowing, I review some 
understandings of experience developed in phenomenology.
 Phenomenological and Feminist Understandings 
of Movement Experience
Within the many theoretical perspectives of Western thinking, phenomenology 
was one approach that recognized experience as a way that individuals come to 
know: a “touchstone” of knowledge (Grosz, 1994; Nettleton & Watson, 1998). 
Phenomenology offered an “attitude” or orientation of paying attention to the 
world as lived and experienced, and this attitude offered the basis for an epis-
temology, theoretical perspective, methodology, method or a combination of 
these (Allen-Collinson, 2011). Within phenomenological writing, the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir (1972, 2010) and Maurice Merleau- Ponty (1962, 1964a, 
1964b) were particularly relevant in offering gendered and situated understand-
ings of lived experience. While phenomenology has remained a marginalized 
perspective, likely due to its focus on lived body and lived experience, it offers
an epistemology and a descriptive method that resonate with many central fem-
inist theoretical concerns: it eschews rationalism and objectifying mind-body 
dualism, and instead invites a focus on embodied, situated, immediate and 
often more affective forms of experience. (Kruks, 2014, p. 76)
Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999) contributed a great deal 
to understanding the experience of movement and bodily knowing. She devel-
oped Merleau-Ponty’s (1962, 1964a) phenomenological work significantly, 
arguing for the primacy of movement over the primacy of perception. She com-
mented that perception results from movement, and thus movement was ‘the 
originating ground of our sense-makings’ (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 161). 
Sheets-Johnstone (1999) argued that humans learn about themselves and others 
initially through moving—by attending to bodily sensations of movement, 
rather than by looking and seeing what is moving. Movement is experienced 
through the kinesthetic sense, providing the individual with information about 
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space, time, movement and objects, and their relationship to these things, as it 
changes in the moment (Stinson, 1995). The kinesthetic sense is fundamental 
to knowledge of what we are, to our basic understanding of the world, and our 
ability to move knowledgeably in the world (Sheets- Johnstone, 1999). In this 
sense, movement experience is of profound epistemological significance (Sheets-
Johnstone, 1999). Sheets-Johnstone writes
A dynamically attuned body that knows the world and makes its way within it 
kinetically is thoughtfully attuned to the variable qualia of both its own move-
ment and the movement of things in its surrounding word—to forceful, swift, 
slow, straight, swerving, flaccid, tense, sudden, up, down and much more. Caught 
up in an adult world, we easily lose sight of movement and of our fundamental 
capacity to thinking in movement. Any time we care to turn our attention to it, 
however, there it is. (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, pp. 516–517)
Sheets-Johnston offered particularly influential description and theorizing of 
dance improvisation as thinking in movement in which there is no separation 
between thinking and doing, and between sensing and moving (Sheets- 
Johnstone, 1999; first published in 1966). Sheets-Johnstone (1999) stimu-
lated further phenomenological and feminist scholarship, particularly in 
dance (including Albright, 1997; Barbour, 2002, 2011a; Fraleigh, 1987; 
Stinson, 1995).
A significant phenomenologist in women’s movement, Iris Marion Young 
(1980) drew on Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964a) and feminist Simone de 
Beauvoir (1972) to develop an understanding of women’s lived bodily experi-
ence. Young wished to articulate the specifics of women’s lived movement 
experience and embodiment, something feminists had noted that Merleau- 
Ponty did not do (Grosz, 1994). Young focused on movement experiences 
aimed at achieving specific tasks, such as ‘throwing like a girl’, and outlined 
basic modalities of feminine body comportment (Young, 1980). She argued 
that a common experience of many Western women involved being both a 
subject for herself and an object. This kind of experience meant that women 
often tended to mediate their actions by imagining how they appeared as 
objects to others, at the same time that they also experienced their actions as 
intentional subjects (Weiss, 1999; Young, 1980). Such experiences resulted in 
a kind of discontinuity between a woman’s intention as a subject undertaking 
a task and her action as an object that she saw from an external perspective.
According to Young (1980), feminine bodily experience was: intentionally 
inhibited (by perception of her own inability to achieve the task undertaken); 
ambiguously transcendent (by concentrating on her action in one part of the 
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body while the rest remained uninvolved); and had a discontinuous unity 
(by breaking her connection between intention and action, between possibil-
ity and actual bodily achievement). Women thus did not utilize their full 
spatial and lateral movement potential (Young, 1980). Young concluded her 
comments by stating that ‘An essential part of the situation of being a woman 
is that of living with the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon 
as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of 
another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living mani-
festation of action and intention’ (1998a, p. 270). Young’s work set the prec-
edent for feminist study of women’s movement experiences separately from 
those of men (1980, 1998b) and offered a basis from which to research wom-
en’s sport, dance, leisure and physical activity. For example, Young’s work 
(1980, 1998b) was extended in research on women’s dance (Albright, 1997; 
Barbour, 2002, 2011a) and climbing (Chisholm, 2008).
In researching women’s contemporary dance, Ann Cooper Albright (1997) 
had applied Young’s work to analyzing particular artists, arguing that some 
dancers were able to expand the norms of feminine movement by demonstrat-
ing clear directed energy, clarity of weight, spatial intention and movement 
flow. According to Albright (1997), such dancing was responsive, enduring, 
able to accommodate change and could offer a more profound experience for 
an audience. While based on other women’s lived experiences, this analysis 
provided inspiration for my phenomenological research into my own and 
other women’s lived experiences as solo dancers. A further inspiration was 
Young’s (1998b) criticism of her own work in which she suggested beginning 
with acknowledging that often multiple things happen at once for many 
women; beginning with multiplicity rather than singularity. My improvisa-
tional practices and choreographic strategies in solo dance had allowed me to 
develop movement that had multiple intentions; to develop kinesthetic empa-
thy with my experiences through the use of everyday, pedestrian and gestural 
movement; to subvert and resist expectations of the dancer; to challenge or 
change stereotypical feminine movement and movement qualities; and ulti-
mately, to be an embodied expression of my lived experience (Barbour, 2002, 
2011a). Thus, multiplicity was a feature of my movement.
I also valued the way in which dance-making processes and performances 
allowed me to be both receptive and responsive to my lived experiences. 
I aimed to receive and integrate information from multiple sources, including 
moment-to-moment changes and understandings developed during perform-
ing, audience responses, events in my life, and choreographed movement 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). I then aimed to respond to these multiple sources in 
whatever manner I felt appropriate in the given moment. I had the  opportunity 
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to improvise, adapt and respond, both thinking in and about movement as I 
danced (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). Instead of experiencing inhibited, partially 
expressive movement and feeling disconnection between my intention and 
action as described in Young’s modalites of feminine movement, and instead of 
only creating a fixed singular plan, finding control and developing singular 
intention (1980, 1998a), I experienced multiplicity in intention, and receptiv-
ity and responsiveness in dancing. As I was thinking in movement, I experi-
enced alternative modalities of feminine movement to those proposed in 
Young’s analysis (Barbour, 2002, 2011b). My feminist narratives of experience 
intersected with phenomenological descriptions and auto-ethnographic repre-
sentations of movement.
In a different movement context, Dianne Chisholm’s (2008) analysis of 
‘climbing like a girl’ offered a descriptive and insightful example of phenomeno-
logical and feminist theorizing. Chisholm critiqued Young’s early work (Young, 
1980), arguing that her ‘focus on feminine motility and spatiality precludes 
analysis of how girls and women can and do embody free movement despite 
masculine domination’ in contemporary life (2008, p. 11). She draws attention 
to the evolving social-cultural contexts in which women now move, arguing 
that Young’s analysis of feminine bodily movement as intentionally inhibited, 
ambiguously transcendent and discontinuous is no longer typical (2008). 
Drawing on interviews with and the autobiography of free climber Lynn Hills 
(2002), Chisholm argues that women may develop alternative modalities of 
feminine movement involving reach, coordination, flow, freedom and synesthe-
sia, both as an “ascent” within climbing and as a feminist way of moving in the 
world (Chisholm, 2008). Hill’s writing offers a rich example of a woman who 
‘habituates her body to dancing on rock with a full-body reach and a flowing 
choreography of moves that extend her direction of her intention over thou-
sands of vertical feet’, illustrating how ‘women can, by cultivating the body’s full 
and free movement, surmount the gender limits of their situation’ (Chisholm, 
2008, p. 35). Chisholm’s (2008) analysis of Hill’s (2002) lived experiences as a 
feminist and phenomenologist supports understandings of women’s movement 
in climbing. Albright’s (1997), Chisholm’s (2008) and my own analyses 
(Barbour, 2002, 2011a) draw richly descriptive accounts of movement experi-
ences together with feminist and phenomenological theorizing by Beauvoir 
(1972), Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964a) and Young (1980), to contribute new 
understandings of women’s lived movement experiences.
Other feminist and phenomenological research in lived movement experi-
ence has emerged more recently and is exemplified in the work of Jacquelyn 
Allen-Collinson on long-distance running (2008, 2011) and Jayne Caudwell 
on rowing (2014). Both are interested in “mundane” and repetitive  movement 
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within their own everyday lived experiences in their specific contexts. 
Acknowledging women’s vulnerability to harassment in public spaces as part of 
her socio-cultural and political context, Allen-Collinson writes: ‘My running in 
public space is thus lived and felt at the individual, subjective level, but is also 
deeply structurally-shaped by my difficulty, as a woman, in securing “an undis-
puted right” to occupy that space’ (2011, p. 308). Allen- Collinson’s descriptions 
illustrate her auto-phenomenographic approach to her lived experiences of 
everyday distance running (2011). Caudwell (2014) describes the pleasures of 
rowing, weaving rich phenomenological descriptions with theory in auto-eth-
nography that evokes her experience on the page as she seeks to understand the 
role of repetitive movement in women’s mental health:
sustained rows on a rowing machine are not dull and unsensual, they are polydi-
mensional affairs and my pleasures are embodied, sensate and visceral. The flows 
of bodily movement require, despite their habitual and repetitive nature, open 
possibilities for the aesthetic, incandescent, reflexive and rhythmic. My curvilin-
ear mundane motion becomes ambivalent, fluid and labile. The ordinariness of 
this repetitive physical activity is punctuated by flows of enjoyment and satisfac-
tion. (2014, pp. 6–7)
Both Allen-Collinson (2008, 2011) and Caudwell (2014) offer phenomeno-
logical descriptions of women’s lived experiences that attest to the different 
ways in which women move through the world, and engage with expanding 
theory and representational methods in feminist research. In this sense, these 
authors build upon the project begun by Beauvoir (1972, 2010) in deliber-
ately contextualizing feminist theorizing in women’s lived experiences.
Feminist and phenomenological research has validated investigating wom-
en’s lived movement experiences as a method of gaining knowledge, and to 
which understandings of the lived body and embodiment are intimately tied.
 Feminist Understandings of Mind/Body 
and Embodiment
Feminist critiques of mind/body dualism aimed to refigure the body at the 
centre of understandings of subjectivity and knowing. Like Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, 1964a), Elizabeth Grosz worked with the phenomenological notion of 
a lived body, as opposed to a corpse. She argued that ‘philosophy has estab-
lished itself on a profound somatophobia’ (1994, p. 5) and aimed instead to 
develop an alternative understanding of bodily subjectivity. Development of 
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alternative understandings of bodies engaged a number of key feminists 
(Bigwood, 1991; Braidotti, 1994; Grosz, 1994; Irigaray, 1985; Young, 1980, 
1998a), as well as more recent scholars.6
Elizabeth Grosz argued that bodies not only had ‘all the explanatory power 
of minds’, but they also immediately drew attention to the question of gender, 
and other markings of race and age (1994, p. vii). Grosz continued: ‘There are 
always only specific types of body, concrete in their determinations, with a 
particular sex, race, and physiognomy’ (1994, p. 19). Thus, the specifics of dif-
ference are central to understanding individuals. Difference has to do both 
with the corporeal aspects of an individual, and with the ‘manner in which 
culture marks bodies and creates specific conditions in which they live and 
recreate themselves’ (Gatens, 1995, p. 71). The body is continually both in the 
process of being shaped by social practices, and at the same time, the means by 
which we are able to express our resistance to socio-cultural and bodily norms 
(Bigwood, 1991; Braidotti, 1994; Gatens, 1995). Such lived bodies strain at 
the seams of socio-cultural and biological fabric, being unstable and open to 
change; always in a process of becoming, rather than existing as a fixed entity 
(Albright, 1997; Diprose 1994/1995; Grosz, 1994; Weiss, 1999). Detailed 
feminist understandings of lived bodies in their specific instances revealed the 
effects both of cultural construction and of corporeality.
Feminist attention to the specificity of different individuals and to particular 
lived bodies (Braidotti, 1994; Flax, 1993; Grosz, 1994; Nettleton & Watson, 
1998; Weiss, 1999) aligned with phenomenological understandings that every 
person is uniquely embodied and that embodiment is the existential condition 
of being a person (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Embodiment neither refers exclu-
sively to, nor privileges natural/corporeal or cultural/social understandings. 
This is an experientially grounded view of an embodied person, as ‘from this 
viewpoint, meaning inheres in our bodily behaviours and its gestural signifi-
cance rather than being the product of some prior disembodied “Cogito”’ 
(Williams & Bendelow, 1998, p. 8). This view requires recognition that to be 
a person, you are necessarily only able to exist and to know anything, as a result 
of being embodied.
From my perspective, embodiment incorporates many things as one: a per-
son’s biological (somatic), intellectual, emotional, bodily, artistic and spiritual 
experience, within their cultural and geographical location. Embodiment is 
not completely arbitrary—it includes recognition of individual difference in 
terms of race, gender, sexuality, ability, history and culture. “Embodiment” 
thus indicates the holistic experiencing, living subject and avoids the tendency 
to reinscribe the biological/cultural distinction.
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 Embodied Ways of Knowing
These feminist critiques of dominant Western knowledge provided the basis 
for new foci on alternative feminist “knowledges”, and by prioritizing lived 
experience and embodiment, feminists began to fulfil the potential of the “per-
sonal as the political”. In drawing these feminist endeavours together, I use the 
phrase “embodied ways of knowing” to indicate my alternative understandings 
of “knowledge” and “body”. Just as embodiment acknowledges individual dif-
ferences as a result of socio-cultural and corporeal aspects and location, embod-
ied ways of knowing incorporates individual differences in knowing also. 
Individual embodied differences are not denied in the pursuit of knowledge or 
the quest for self, but are brought to the forefront, and gender differences are 
central.
Developing the work of Belenky et al. (1986), I offered this possible sixth 
epistemological strategy:
 6. Embodied knowledge—woman views all knowledge as contextual and 
embodied. She experiences herself as creator of, and as embodying knowl-
edge, valuing her own experiential ways of knowing and reconciling these 
with other strategies for knowing, as she lives her life.
An individual woman using an embodied way of knowing attempts to 
understand knowledges as constructed (Belenky et al., 1986), and further, as 
something that she embodies; that she experiences and lives. She attempts to 
integrate the knowledges that she feels intuitively are important with what she 
has learned from others, and with a conscious awareness of how she embodies 
these knowledges. She aims to weave knowledges together with her passions, 
experiences and individuality. For an individual woman using an embodied 
knowledge strategy, living with alternative understandings to dominant 
knowledge will likely create challenges and tensions that she will have to 
resolve throughout her life. Resolutions will not come only through rational-
ization or intuition, but through embodying and living out the possibilities. 
In living out the possibilities, she will necessarily come to discard knowledge 
that is not liveable.
Using an embodied knowing strategy, I theorized that a feminist might resist 
and deconstruct dominant and oppressive stereotypes of femininity, recreating 
herself differently as she lives out the possibilities. I used theword “recreating” 
to indicate the process by which a woman might use embodied ways of know-
ing to creatively adapt personal beliefs and behaviours in order to resolve the 
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tensions inherent in being a woman in a patriarchal context (Barbour, 2002, 
2004, 2011a, 2011b). This may well be a lifelong feminist process. Interrogation 
of her own daily behaviour and movement, her moral and political commit-
ments, her spiritual beliefs, her artistic practice, her employment choices, her 
relationships with other individuals, with dominant Western culture and her 
geographical environment, will involve a high degree of sensitivity and scepti-
cism. In her recreations of herself as a woman, she will experience intellectual, 
spiritual, artistic, physical and emotional tensions arising from her alternative 
perspectives and practices of femininity. She will need to be articulate and 
compassionate in her embodied expression of her recreated self. And she will 
need extraordinary passion and commitment to live out her solutions. This, 
I suggest, is an embodied way of knowing herself as a woman.
In the context of my own research in embodied ways of knowing in dance, 
I have considered feminist choreographic practices in dance making. This 
immersion in the lived experience of dancing has led to recreations of practice 
for both live performance and for digital dance making, and also within 
improvisational dance practices. Immersion in the somatic, sensory- embodied 
experiences of dance have also offered opportunities to reconsider how I teach 
movement.
It seemed to me that a creative and artistic sensibility would be invaluable in 
embodied ways of knowing. In particular, a greater level of sensitivity to per-
sonal experience, and relationships with others and the world would be crucial. 
Particular artistic and movement practices and life choices might allow an indi-
vidual to enhance her sensitivity and cultivate more sustainable relationships 
with others and with local environments. For these reasons, I think individual 
women may have unique alternative possibilities for recreations of femininity in 
their lives, and a broader range of embodied expressive strategies than are offered 
in traditional Western epistemology.
The research literature on women’s movement not only draws on the sharing 
of rich phenomenological and feminist first-person descriptions of lived experi-
ence, but also engages creatively with narratives, poetry, auto- phenomenography, 
auto-ethnography and performance. To paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir (1972), 
creative representations (in literature, performance and/or research) offer the 
opportunity to reflect on personal experiences, share empathetically in the expe-
riences of another and to experience another’s truth as one’s own—an epistemo-




With reference to a range of feminist writers who have critiqued and decon-
structed Western “knowledge” and dualisms, I have explored some his to rical 
critiques and key understandings of women’s ways of knowing and 
 embodiment. My exploration led me to articulate the possibilities for under-
standing ways of “knowing” more broadly than simply as “reasoning”, reflect-
ing the research of Belenky et al. (1986) and Goldberger et al. (1996), and 
phenomenologists Young (1980, 1998a) and Sheets-Johnstone (1999). 
Exploring feminist understandings of embodiment, my interests turned to 
articulating embodied ways of knowing. Investigating women’s lived move-
ment experiences, I have argued that feminist, phenomenological and embod-
ied perspectives and methodologies are appropriate. I suggested that embodied 
ways of knowing are invaluable to feminists throughout their lifetimes. How 
such embodied ways of knowing play out in our everyday lives as active 
women may thus be a focus for future creative research within the fields of 
dance, sport, leisure and physical activity.
Notes
1. Portions of this chapter are based upon my doctoral research (Barbour, 2002) 
and published works (Barbour, 2004, 2011a, 2011b) re-used with permission.
2. Plato lived 428–348 BC and Aristotle lived 384–322 BC (Allen, 1966).
3. Rene Descartes lived 1596–1650 (Descartes, 1968) and Immanuel Kant lived 
1724–1804 (Scruton, 1982).
4. These dualisms are debated at length in feminist literature.
5. For discussion about women’s ways of knowing as a developmental scheme, see 
Code (1991).
6. The feminists here represent a range of feminist perspectives and each offered a 
slightly different understanding of body. I adapted understandings as relevant.
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